Thursday, August 4, 2022

Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned China to restrain its military operations around Taiwan in order to avoid the “unintended consequences” of a crisis following House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit this week.

Blinken warns China not to risk 'unintended consequences' of military crisis over Taiwan

“I hope very much that Beijing will not manufacture a crisis or seek a pretext to increase its aggressive military activity,” Blinken said Thursday while traveling in Cambodia for a summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). “We, and countries around the world, believe that escalation serves no one and could have unintended consequences that serve no one’s interests, including ASEAN members and including China.”

China conducts military exercises off Taiwan after warning Pelosi to scrap visit

PLA carries out ‘live-fire exercises’ after US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi told not to visit the island democracy

President Xi Jinping warned his US counterpart, Joe Biden, in a phone call on Thursday against ‘external interference’ in Beijing’s dealings with the island. Photograph: Reuters

Associated Press in BeijingSat 30 Jul 2022 12.38 EDT

China said it was conducting military exercises off its coast opposite Taiwan after warning Nancy Pelosi, the Speaker of the US House of Representatives, to scrap possible plans to visit the island democracy.

The ruling Communist party’s military wing, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), was conducting “live-fire exercises” near the Pingtan islands off Fujian province from 8am to 9pm on Saturday, the official Xinhua news agency said. The Maritime Safety Administration warned ships to avoid the area.

Such exercises usually involve artillery. The one-sentence announcement gave no indication whether the exercises also may include missiles, fighter planes or other weapons.

China has fully militarized three islands in South China Sea, US admiral says

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Pelosi, who would be the highest-ranking American elected official to visit Taiwan since 1997, has yet to confirm whether she will go.

President Xi Jinping warned his US counterpart, Joe Biden, in a phone call on Thursday against “external interference” in Beijing’s dealings with the island.

China says Taiwan has no right to conduct foreign relations. It sees visits by American officials as encouragement for the island to make its decades-old de facto independence official.

The First Island Chain is defined as the chain of islands that begins at the Kuril Islands, runs through the Japanese Archipelago, the Ryukyu Islands and the island of Taiwan, the northwestern portion of the Philippines (particularly Luzon, Mindoro and Palawan) and finishes towards Borneo, and used to extend to the Spratly Island and the southern Vietnamese coast prior to the Vietnam War. The chain also serves as the maritime boundaries between the East China Sea and the Philippine Sea, and the South China Sea and the Sulu Sea.
The First Island Chain was conceptualized during the Cold War as the first line of defense to contain the spread of influence of the Soviet Union and its allied socialist countries in East and Southeast Asia. The midpoint and key part of the first chain was — and still is — Taiwan. Because the island chain is composed of a series of landmasses, it is also called the "unsinkable aircraft carrier", especially in reference to Taiwan.

THEN DESTROY CHINESE MILITARY ASSETS with Offensive Anti-Surface Weapon

The Navy has finally pushed into production a next generation surface-to-surface missile under its “Offensive Anti-Surface Weapon” program—by adapting a weapon already in use with the Air Force. The AGM-158 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile is a stealthy and highly precise surface-skimming cruise missile with a range of 230 miles, or 620 for the Extended Range AGM-158B. The shorter-range AGM-158A model saw its combat debut on April 4, 2018, when two B-1B bombers launched nineteen of the stealth missiles at a Syrian research center in Barzeh.

The SPY-6 radars family advances the technical curve in a number of tactically significant respects, in part because it can combine ballistic missile defense and air and missile defense into a single integrated system. This synergy gives the system an ability to track and help destroy enemy drones, aircraft, cruise missiles and long-range incoming ballistic missiles.

Japanese, Spanish and Canadian warships are evolving their maritime missile defense posture to expand the envelope at which it can detect and destroy incoming missiles, hypersonic weapons and even intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). To accomplish this, their warships are integrating a new high-powered, more sensitive ship-based radar system engineered to achieve longer ranges and greater precision. The concept is, among other things, to empower Navy ships with an ability to track and destroy enemy ICBMs from the ocean.

US TAKE POSSESSION OF SCARBOROUGH SHOAL LOCATED AT THE GATES OF MANILA, 120 MILES WEST OF SUBIC BAY,

I believe China will expand its influence over Taiwan to breakout of the first Island Chain as it is necessary for China to move toward the Second Island Chain. ie Guam, Hawaii and the West Coast.

The Western block would consist of the US, NATO, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. The Eastern block would consist of Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, basically all of the Middle East, Serbia, and Belarus. There will unlikely be any large scale fighting near American soil in a strictly conventional war situation. Firstly, let us start with Asia. The United States, Japan, and South Korea. would send their navy to counter North Korea, and China. South Korea would strictly focus on North Korea and would win with relative ease. The United States would focus on China, and Japan would focus on North Korea and China. The United States, India and Japan would form a blockade around China. This would lead to the US and Japan destroying their nuclear launch sites and all aircraft that can carry nuclear weapons. The US air-force, assisted by Japan, would control the skies over China. They would launch devastating airstrikes and would pierce their land defenses. This would all lead to the withdrawal of China, as they would probably not want to surrender. This would be a major victory for the US and Japan in Asia. Overall, it would be a costly US led coalition victory. China, would be recovering from the massive Japanese/American bombardment. North Korea would be under South Korean rule and they would begin to slowly recover and become prosperous. Japan would be trying to recover from the Chinese. They would still remain prosperous. The United States and Canada would remain relatively safe. America, being a war based economy, would profit greatly. Australia would be safe and would not really change at all.

The underlying factors are the growth of Chinese power, Chinese dissatisfaction with the US-led regional security system, and US alliance commitments to a variety of regional states. As long as these factors hold, the possibility for war will endure.

Whatever the trigger, the war does not begin with a US pre-emptive attack against Chinese fleet, air, and land-based installations. Although the US military would prefer to engage and destroy Chinese anti-access assets before they can target US planes, bases, and ships, it is extremely difficult to envisage a scenario in which the United States decides to pay the political costs associated with climbing the ladder of escalation.

Instead, the United States needs to prepare to absorb the first blow. This doesn’t necessarily mean that the U.S. Navy (USN) and U.S. Air Force (USAF) have to wait for Chinese missiles to rain down upon them, but the United States will almost certainly require some clear, public signal of Chinese intent to escalate to high-intensity, conventional military combat before it can begin engaging Chinese forces.

If the history of World War I gives any indication, the PLA will not allow the United States to fully mobilize in order to either launch a first strike, or properly prepare to receive a first blow. At the same time, a “bolt from the blue” strike is unlikely. Instead, a brewing crisis will steadily escalate over a few incidents, finally triggering a set of steps on the part of the US military that indicate to Beijing that Washington is genuinely prepared for war. These steps will include surging carrier groups, shifting deployment to Asia from Europe and the Middle East, and moving fighter squadrons towards the Pacific. At this moment, China will need to decide whether to push forward or back down.

On the economic side, Beijing and Washington will both press for sanctions (the US effort will likely involve a multilateral effort), and will freeze each others assets, as well as those of any co-belligerents. This will begin the economic pain for capital and consumers across the Pacific Rim, and the rest of the world. The threat of high intensity combat will also disrupt global shipping patterns, causing potentially severe bottlenecks in industrial production.

Whether US allies support American efforts against China depends on how the war begins. If war breaks out over a collapse of the DPRK, the United States can likely count on the support of South Korea and Japan. Any war stemming from disputes in the East China Sea will necessarily involve Japan. If events in the South China Sea lead to war, the US can probably rely on some of the ASEAN states, as well as possibly Japan. Australia may also support the US over a wide range of potential circumstances.

China faces a less complicated situation with respect to allies. Beijing could probably expect benevolent neutrality, including shipments of arms and spares, from Russia, but little more. The primary challenge for Chinese diplomats would be establishing and maintaining the neutrality of potential US allies. This would involve an exceedingly complex dance, including reassurances about Chinese long-term intentions, as well as displays of confidence about the prospects of Chinese victory (which would carry the implicit threat of retribution for support of the United States).

North Korea presents an even more difficult problem. Any intervention on the part of the DPRK runs the risk of triggering Japanese and South Korean counter-intervention, and that math doesn’t work out for China. Unless Beijing is certain that Seoul and Tokyo will both throw in for the United States (a doubtful prospect given their hostility to one another), it may spend more time restraining Pyongyang than pushing it into the conflict.

The US will pursue the following war aims:

1. Defeat the affirmative expeditionary purpose of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).

2. Destroy the offensive capability of the PLAN and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF).

3. Potentially destabilize the control of the CCP government over mainland China.
4. Liberate Tibet from Chinese rule by the action of India.t

Except in the case of a war that breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, the first task involves either defeating a Chinese attempt to land forces, or preventing the reinforcement and resupply of those troops before forcing their surrender. The second task will require a wide range of attacks against deployed Chinese air and naval units, as well as ships and aircraft held in reserve. We can expect, for example, that the USN and USAF will target Chinese airbases, naval bases, and potentially missile bases in an effort to maximize damage to the PLAN and PLAAF. The third task probably depends on the successful execution of the first two. The defeat of Chinese expeditionary forces, and the destruction of a large percentage of the PLAN and the PLAAF, may cause domestic turmoil in the medium to long term. US military planners would be well-advised to concentrate the strategic campaign on the first two objectives and hope that success has a political effect, rather than roll the dice on a broader “strategic” campaign against CCP political targets. The latter would waste resources, run the risk of escalation, and have unpredictable effects on the Chinese political system.

Japan is very much the flavor of the current Indian season. Especially when juxtaposed against China, Japan is acknowledged by New Delhi as being one of the most significant maritime players in the Indo-Pacific. Indeed, Japan’s steadily deteriorating and increasingly fractious relationship with China is a prominent marker of the general fragility of the geopolitical situation prevailing almost throughout the Indo-Pacific. Within this fragile environment, New Delhi is seeking to maintain its own geopolitical pre-eminence in the IOR and relevance in the Indo-Pacific as a whole by adroitly managing China’s growing assertiveness. In this process, Japan and the USA (along with Australia, Vietnam, South Korea, and Indonesia) collectively offer India a viable alternative to Sino-centric hegemony within the region. However, before it places too many of its security eggs in a Japanese basket, it is important for India to examine at least the more prominent historical and contemporary contours of the Sino-Japanese relationship. As India expands her footprint across the Indo-Pacific and examines the overtures of Japan and the USA to seek closer geopolitical coordination with both, it is vital to ensure that our country and our navy are not dragged by ignorance, misinformation or disinformation, into the law of unintended consequences.Map of Sea of Japan. This could be the scenario in the conflict between India, Japan and USA against China and Russia. Although the videos are cartoon like, they are mostly accurate to some degree. With Japan, Ausrtalia, UK and Vietnam alliance China will be overwhelmed.

The influence of China, with its ancient and extraordinarily well-developed civilization, upon the much younger civilization of Japan has been enormous. Even the sobriquet for Japan — the Land of the Rising Sun — is derived from a Chinese perspective, since when the Chinese looked east to Japan they looked in the direction of the dawn. As Japan began to consolidate itself as a nation, between the 1st and the 6th Century CE, it increasingly copied the Chinese model of national development, administration, societal structure and culture. And yet, for all that, there is also a history of deep animosity between the two countries, which manifested itself across of whole range of actions and reactions. At one end was China’s disapproval of Japan attempting to equate itself with the Middle Kingdom (as when Japan Prince Shotoku, in 607 CE, sent a letter to the Sui emperor, Yangdi, “from the Son of Heaven in the land where the sun rises to the Son of Heaven in the land where the sun sets.”) At the other, lay armed conflict. Over the course of the past two millennia, Japan and China have gone to war five times. The common thread in each has been a power struggle on the Korean Peninsula. Even their more contemporary animosity dates back to at least 1894 — during the Meiji Restoration in Japan. It is true that, much like India and Pakistan, relations between China and Japan have witnessed periods of great optimism. For instance, Sino–Japanese relations in the 1970s and early 1980s were undeniably positive and ‘historical animosity’ was not a factor strong enough to foster tensions between the two nations at the time. However, it is also true, once again like India and Pakistan, that these periods of hope have been punctuated by a mutuality of visceral hatred. In the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, China, which was mired in political conflict and civil war, suffered eight months of comprehensive defeats leading, amongst other indignities, to the occupation of Taiwan by Japan. The historical echoes of this horrific conflict and its humiliating aftermath for China resonate to this day.

The South China Sea has never occupied the top rung on Beijing’s foreign policy agenda, except perhaps during the Philippines’ initiation of arbitration against China’s claims of historic rights in 2013 and the Hague tribunal’s decision in 2016. Given economic reforms, protests in Hong Kong, President Tsai Ing-wen’s renewed mandate in Taiwan, censure of its security policies in Xinjiang, trade talks and great power rivalry with the United States, and the ongoing public health crisis of the novel coronavirus, Beijing will have its hands full. It may have little left in its tank for the South China Sea. In contrast, the six-way territorial and maritime row represents the most pressing security and foreign policy priority for other claimants. This sharp asymmetry may stimulate a willingness on the part of the biggest claimant to concede and negotiate with other disputants. That would jive well with China’s stated intention to project good neighborliness and settle the issue among the claimants without intervention by other powers. However, this readiness for dialogue may not necessarily extend to other maritime powers, especially as the South China Sea gradually emerges as a theater for great power competition.

China is apparently taking a more active role in conveying its narrative and engaging international think-tanks and publics. In April 2019, the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative was launched by the Peking University Institute of Ocean Research. Earlier this year, the initiative has already held exchanges with regional counterparts in Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines. This is on top of the Hainan-based National Institute for South China Sea Studies setup in 2004 which has also been holding exchanges with foreign counterparts. Whether these attempts at public diplomacy allay concerns among Southeast Asian claimants remains to be seen.

Meanwhile, the high priority given to the dispute by other claimants means that they will exhaust the broad gamut of defense, diplomatic, and legal redress to safeguard their interests. Vietnam, for instance, concluded the 11th iteration of its Diplomatic Academy’s annual South China Sea conference in November 2019, drawing local and international experts. But pushback against Chinese incursions tends to wax and wane, and approaches vary among claimants. The nature of the threat posed by Chinese actions and the degree of economic ties with China are important variables to consider here.

Having lost the Paracels in 1974 and Johnson Reef in 1988, not to mention fighting China in a bitter land border war in 1979, Vietnam traditionally pushes back the hardest. Possible resort to legal means and international forums, especially as the country chairs ASEAN this year and assumes a nonpermanent seat on the UN Security Council (2020-2021), will diversify Hanoi’s toolkit and raise the stakes for future Chinese interference in Vietnam’s marine economic activities. The Philippines took a tougher stance after losing Mischief Reef in 1995 and control over Scarborough Shoal in 2012. The first incident pushed the country to modernize its armed forces (1995) and eventually sign a Visiting Forces Agreement (1999) with its longtime treaty ally, the United States. The second incident compelled the country to launch a legal challenge to China’s excessive maritime claims (2013) and allow U.S. troops a rotational presence in mutually agreed locations throughout the country via the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (2014). Last year, Manila also sought and obtained greater clarity on the scope of its Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States. However, Manila’s recent move to abrogate the Visiting Forces Agreement may undercut the value of the alliance at a time of growing Chinese presence in the disputed sea.

Further from China’s reach, Malaysia and Brunei have long pursued quiet diplomacy. But with Chinese outposts now enabling distant fishing fleets and patrols to scour the sea’s southern reaches, they, as well as Indonesia, may eventually recalibrate their strategy. Indonesia’s tough response to foreign illegal fishing in its waters and its strong posturing in the Natunas creates disquiet in its relations with China as well as with ASEAN neighbors like Vietnam. Thus, China’s assertiveness and the smaller claimants’ heightened sense of insecurity generates the potential for conflict, drawing other major powers in—to Beijing’s displeasure.

In addition, in the interest of gaining legitimacy, smaller claimants have been aligning their maritime claims with international law, notably the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Malaysia’s submission of its second extended continental shelf (ECS) claim in the South China Sea last December is instructive. Prior to that, Vietnam and Malaysia jointly submitted an ECS claim in 2009, a move which compelled Beijing to officially articulate its nine-dash line claim. The Philippines, meanwhile, ratified its first ever maritime boundary delimitation agreement with Indonesia last year. These legal foundations may serve to pressure Beijing to bring its claims into conformity with international law. This is especially so after the landmark 2016 arbitral award invalidated China’s claimed “historic rights” and ruled that none of the features in the contested Spratly Islands are capable of generating exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Other claimants will likely continue to pursue their own ECS submissions and EEZ delimitations in the South China Sea.

Southeast Asian claimants will also push back against Chinese overtures to upend security engagement and offshore energy undertakings with other countries in the South China Sea. The deep and complex web of alliances and partnerships, to which security and economic engagement with China forms just one part, is integral to ASEAN’s centrality and autonomy, an aspiration threatened by growing major power rivalry. The 2019 defense white papers of Malaysia and Vietnam both recognized this context of great power competition. Hanoi, for one, added a new caveat in its defense policy, expressing readiness to develop military relations with other countries while still upholding its four nos policy: no military alliances, no siding with one country against another, no foreign military bases, and no use of force or threat to use force in its international relations. This is a significant departure in Vietnam’s strategic thinking and goes to show the extent to which Chinese actions are driving such shifts.

In relation to hydrocarbons in the South China Sea, Southeast Asian claimants resist Chinese demands to terminate upstream contracts with foreign companies from non-claimant states because doing so would adversely affect investor confidence even outside the energy sector. For example, despite being compelled to suspend Spanish firm Repsol’s offshore work in 2017 and 2018, Vietnam continued to encourage Russian, Japanese, Indian, and U.S. energy companies to operate in its EEZ in the South China Sea. The Philippines likewise suggested it would welcome involvement from Russian energy company Rosneft in the country’s oil and gas projects. This said, the continued retreat of Western investors from offshore projects around the South China Sea may facilitate Beijing’s proposed joint development model by leaving its neighbors with few options. For instance, the exit of U.S.-based Chevron from Malampaya, the Philippines’ largest natural gas field located in the South China Sea, and the purchase of its equity by Udenna Group may pave the way for China National Offshore Oil Corporation to acquire a stake in the aging gas field that supplies up to 40 percent of the electricity for Luzon, the country’s main island. Last year, Phoenix Petroleum, one of Udenna’s companies, signed a deal with the Chinese state-owned company to develop a liquified natural gas terminal. ExxonMobil was also rumored to be exiting from the Blue Whale project off Vietnam as part of the company’s divestment efforts.

In sum, notwithstanding bilateral and regional efforts at dispute management and confidence building, the level of importance that claimants will assign to the South China Sea disputes and the extent to which they will push back against coercion will foretell how tempestuous the South China Sea will get in 2020.

Strategy to Defeat China in The SCS

The air campaign in Desert Storm was a watershed for air power. It demonstrated the effectiveness of precision munitions, marked a high water point for electronic warfare and introduced radar stealth in a decisive manner. It also established a template for the application of air power that has taken root in Air Force culture and remains firmly established a quarter century later.

During this COVID-19 global crisis, when

Before the shooting war begins, and after a hostile action made by China, activate naval and air forces in blocading Chinese economic access to the western Pacific and the sources of oil in the Sumatran Straights. In effect all US forces are in their full readiness without the time element of transporting from the distant mainland of the US. At the outset of the shooting war, sink all surface Chinese ships and submarine, after radar and SAM coastal batteries have been neutralized using our airforce stealth bombers and jet fighters.

Continue to limit the access of the Chinese Surface ships to the Western Pacific islands by mining the ports and islands. Limit the energy resource and commercial maritime intercourse which China is so dependent upon. The primary objective here is to effectively neutralize certain elements of PRC military power by starving it of energy. In contrast with maritime interdiction, strategic interdiction is not an airtight blockade but a targeted effort to interdict primarily the production and transport of energy resources all the way back to the source. A campaign would have four elements:

A “counterforce” effort designed to stop the adversary air forces (particularly bombers), naval forces (gray hulls) and naval auxiliaries (replenishment) to the point where they can neither project military power nor defend against U.S. power projection, at least far beyond the PRC continental shelf.

Chinese military force design has been built specifically to counter the U.S. Air Force’s reliance on stealth and forward basing, and to reduce the threat of carrier aviation by developing weapons designed to keep the carriers far away from the action. Our response has been to plan to fight symmetrically, matching our technological widgets against theirs in a battle in the PRC’s front yardTerritorial Disputes in the South China Se

The most prominent Sino-Japanese contributor to contemporary geopolitical fragility is the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands dispute. This is an extremely high-risk dispute that could very easily lead to armed conflict, especially in the wake of Japan’s nationalization of three of the islands in September 2013. Reacting strongly to this unilateral action by Japan, China established an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) on 23 November, 2013, encompassing (inter alia) these very islands. This, in turn, was immediately challenged by the USA, Japan, and South Korea. Within days of the Chinese declaration, military aircraft from all three countries flew through China’s ADIZ without complying with the promulgated ADIZ regulations. Perhaps because of the robustness of this response, China has not been enforcing this ADIZ with any great vigour, but has not withdrawn it either. It is appreciated that this is a long-term play, because China would acquire strategic advantage by asserting a maximalist position, then seeming to back down, while preserving some incremental gain — akin to a ‘ratchet’ effect. This is an example of ‘salami slicing’ — of which much has been made in a variety of Indian and Western media.

China’s increased military activities in this maritime area have certainly caused a fivefold rise in the frequency with which Japanese fighter jets have been forced to scramble in preparedness against Chinese aircraft intrusions into Japanese airspace over the East China Sea (ECS). Japanese aircraft have moved up from 150 scrambles in 2011 to a staggering 1,168 scrambles in FY 2016-17. (The Japanese FY, like that of India, runs from 01 April to 31 March.) Given that fighter pilots are young, aggressive, and trained to use lethal force almost intuitively, this dramatic increase in frequency of scrambles causes a corresponding increase in the chance of a miscalculation on the part of one or both parties that could result in a sudden escalation into active hostilities.

Even more worrying is the prospect that once China completes her building of airfields on a sufficient number of reefs in the Spratly Island Group, she would promulgate an ADIZ in the South China Sea. Should she do so, the inevitable challenges to such an ADIZ would probably bring inter-state geopolitical tensions to breaking point.

All in all, the increased militarization and current involvement of the armed forces of both countries in the Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands have grave implications for geopolitical stability. To cite a well-used colloquialism, “once you open a can of worms, the only way you can put them back is to use a bigger can.” In the case of the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands, both Japan and the PRC have certainly opened ‘a can of worms’ and now both are looking for a bigger can. Thus, both countries are jockeying for geopolitical options with both the USA as well as with other geopolitical powers that can be brought around to roughly align with their respective point of view. Japan’s alliance with the USA and its active wooing of India and Australia with constructs such as Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond is one such ‘larger can.’

Yet, Japan’s geopolitical insecurities in its segment of the Indo-Pacific are not solely about the Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands. Japan’s apprehension in 2004-05 that China’s exploitation of the Chunxiao gas field (located almost on the EEZ boundary line — as Japan perceives it) was pulling natural gas away from the subterranean extension of the field into the Japanese side of the EEZ boundary brought the two countries to the brink of a military clash. While the situation has been contained for the time being, it remains a potential flashpoint. Across the Sea of Japan /East Sea lie other historical and contemporary challenges in the form of the two Koreas, a Russia that appears to be in a protracted state of geopolitical flux, and of course, the omnipresent elephant in the room, namely, the People’s Republic of China.

Closer home, Japan’s Maritime Self Defense Force (JMSDF) is present and surprisingly active in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) as well. Its interest in maintaining freedom of navigation within the International Shipping Lanes to and from West Asia in general, and the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Aden in particular, are well known features of Tokyo’s ‘energy security’ and ‘security-of-energy’ policies. Off the Horn of Africa at the southern tip of the Gulf of Aden, the ‘war-lord-ism’ that substitutes for governance in Somalia is a source of strategic concern at a number of levels.

Chinese soldiers sit atop tanks as they drive in a parade to celebrate the 70th Anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China in Beijing on Oct. 1. KEVIN FRAYER/GETTY IMAGES

Many observers believe China is building up its military, especially its navy, to break through the first and second island chains and push the United States out of the Asia-Pacific. China’s military expansion in the region is thus seen as a major threat against U.S. interests and security.

But there’s a big problem with the language involved. Phrases like “pushing the United States out of the Asia-Pacific,” “China’s military expansion in Asia,” or “breaking the two island chains” create the image of a physical process, of the Chinese military pressuring U.S. troops and bases in the Asia-Pacific until they can no longer resist and are forced to leave. In reality, both the goal and the process are different—and unless U.S. strategists rectify the way they think about this, they could come to dangerous conclusions.

This isn’t about a physical outcome, but a political one. It doesn’t refer just to U.S. bases in Japan or South Korea. The United States has no permanent bases in the Philippines, but, because of the two countries’ mutual defense treaty, U.S. troops would defend the Philippines in case of attack. China’s goal isn’t just to remove U.S. personnel or equipment from the region, or even to prevent rotational deployments or joint exercises in the Asia-Pacific; it’s to limit or eliminate Washington’s influence over countries in the region, including, ideally, through the termination of their defense treaties and the Taiwan Relations Act, which commits the United States to support Taiwan’s defense.

This doesn’t mean that China is looking to completely extricate the United States from Asian and Pacific countries: It’s OK if they continue trading, or if U.S. companies invest there. But China’s goal is to constrain Washington’s influence to the point that it would no longer try, or would be unable, to convince regional governments to take measures against China such as banning Huawei fifth-generation technology.As long as Washington remains their chief partner, the U.S. government would still be able to convince Tokyo and Seoul to take anti-China measures.

It will help Beijing little if U.S. troops leave Japan and South Korea, but their mutual defense treaties remain in force. As long as Washington remains their chief partner, the U.S. government would still be able to convince Tokyo and Seoul to take anti-China measures, such as restricting Chinese tech companies it considers national-security threats—even if the assurance of U.S. troops as a tripwire against aggression were removed.

Yet in both Beijing and Washington, there’s a belief that, if China establishes regional military superiority over the United States, it will be able to push the United States out of the Asia-Pacific region. But transforming that military superiority into political influence is far trickier than it seems.

Imagine that it’s 2025, and China’s military has become stronger and more active, while the United States failed to keep up in the Asia-Pacific. Think tanks and experts warn that the military balance has shifted in China’s favor and, in case of war, it’s likely that it would prevail. Would U.S. allies, from Seoul to Canberra, decide to ditch the United States and align themselves with the rising hegemon, fulfilling demands such as Chinese sovereignty over the archipelago in the South China Sea known as the Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands, or censorship of local anti-China voices? Or would they stick to the United States, building up their military capabilities and strengthening other military alliances?

Both U.S. allies and neutral countries in the Asia-Pacific already fear China’s growing power and its geopolitical demands. This is happening while the military balance is still in Washington’s favor. If China becomes more powerful, it will also become more threatening. With the exception of India, all other regional countries are dwarfed by China. If left alone, they would have to acquiesce to any and all demands coming from Beijing, as they would stand zero chance of prevailing in a bilateral military conflict.

The United States, even if weaker than China, would be their only hope in such an adverse geopolitical environment. A more menacing China would also galvanize the U.S.government and public to confront it. Military expansion can’t achieve China’s goals by itself.Unless the United States willingly abandons its competition with China, Beijing will never create the military gap necessary to scare the entire region into submission.

Chinese military power could force the United States out of the region in two scenarios: a China so dwarfing the U.S, presence in the region that its might is unassailable, or a decisive military victory. The first scenario needs the United States to weaken so much that regional military planners would no longer believe that it can impose enough costs on China, thus voiding alliances of any deterrent effect. Combined with Chinese economic sanctions or military skirmishes, Asian and Pacific countries might be forced to cut ties with the United States, if it’s clear that they serve no defense purpose. But the odds of a U.S. government ever allowing so vast a gap to emerge are very low.The other scenario, a war, would necessitate a crystal-clear military victory over the United States, maybe including the invasion and occupation of an ally. A simple tactical win wouldn’t suffice. If China defeats the Japan-U.S. alliance by sinking a few ships and bombing some bases, leading to a diplomatic agreement that gave Beijing control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, would the Japanese government later surrender its defense treaty with the United States and remain at Beijing’s mercy? This would make no strategic sense. More likely, it would strengthen military ties with the United States and maybe develop a nuclear capability to deter any further Chinese threats. Only a devastating defeat in a full-blown conflict that risks nuclear war could achieve such a goal—something China desires as little as anyone else.

Tuesday, August 2, 2022

Elon Musk JUST DESTROYED Russia's Best Rocket! Elon Musk has just destroyed Russia’s best rocket by replacing it with his own technology. Thanks to SpaceX, the US can now have a breather in terms of the space race, but it wasn't this way long ago. The US did depend on Russia for its rocket engines since they were one of the best engines ever built so far. On the other hand, Russia, on the other hand, offers its engines to American companies to lift their spaceships into space, but it all changed when the Russian-Ukrainian War began. After posing economic sanctions on Putin’s nation, the US space manufacturing companies did have to find an alternative. Luckily, America has Elon Musk, and we know what all he is capable of. With his team, SpaceX created an engine that is far better and even more cost-effective than compared to Russia’s rocket engine.

Elon Musk’s New Nuclear Rocket SHOCKS The Entire Space Industry! On the 19th of July 2019, Elon Musk said that “Nuclear thermal rockets for fast transit around the solar system would be a great area of research for NASA” but now he seems to have implemented this idea on his own. As nuclear power-related innovations plan to make interstellar travel faster, more effective, and less expensive, mankind is poised to shape the future of space travel to Mars, our solar system, and beyond. We may be on the verge of entering the age of nuclear-powered space flight. Elon Musk calls it the holy grail of space technology. The nuclear rocket created by Musk might just have revolutionised the way we think about space travel. Getting Off The Earth: SpaceX CEO Elon Musk is extremely keen on getting humanity off this planet. And that's more important than ever given the fact that humanity is staring down the barrel of climate change, comet strikes, and dropping birth rates — not to mention, in his words, "good ol' nuclear Armageddon." On November 27th 2021, during an appearance at the National Academies’ joint meeting of the Space Studies Board and Board on Physics and Astronomy, Musk elaborated on his ambitious plans to get a permanent base on Mars established. Musk's argument is simple. Perhaps by the time the next massive asteroid approaches, we'll have developed the technology to shelter the earth or reroute the space rock. However, if anything more terrible occurs, such as a nearby star exploding, we may all be annihilated. Musk claims that we can't afford to wait and find out. It would be simpler to fly if we used fusion power. Researchers are devising methods to capture the massive amount of energy generated during fusion events and utilise it to power a propulsion system. A fusion-powered spaceship might speed up the timeframe for a manned Mars trip by reducing the time it takes to reach Mars. This type of spacecraft might mitigate the negative effects of radiation and weightlessness. The creation of a fusion-powered spaceship would be analogous to the development of an earth-based vehicle with double the peak speed of any car and a fuel economy of 7000 miles per gallon. Although the idea is fascinating and exciting, it is easier said than done. The Limitations Of Current Technology: Humans have been attracted by the stars above them in a variety of ways since the dawn of civilization, but there appears to be a particularly strong modern interest in the astrophysics of the cosmos beyond our solar system. This is due in part to the fact that space agencies throughout the world are conducting a number of new scientific studies. There is a need to develop new propulsion systems that enable substantially greater velocities than are currently possible. Nuclear fusion is one of the most promising options for sending autonomous probes to the closest stars during a human's lifetime,

although economically feasible results have yet to be proved. The most significant barrier to interstellar travel is a lack of sufficient technology; the fact that the stars are so far away is the main problem with getting there. The nearest star to us, Proxima Centauri, is 4.3 light-years distant, which is equal to 269 000 astronomical units au, where 1au equals the average distance between the earth and our sun, which is around 150 000 kilometres. The sun is approximately 7 000 times further away than our solar system's most distant dwarf planet, Pluto, which circles the sun on average at a distance of roughly 40 a.u. In that instance, how long do you think it would take for a probe to reach Proxima? The Voyager 1 probe, launched in 1977 to examine Jupiter and Saturn, was the fastest human-built spacecraft. It left the solar system in 2012 and is presently travelling at a speed of 17 kilometres per second (3.6 au per year). If it were headed in that direction, it would take nearly 74 000 years for Voyager 1 to reach Proxima. From a human standpoint, that is not an ideal time frame for a researcher to wait for their results. The utility of the space probe is very certainly dependent on its capacity to return data within a time period suited for humans, such as decades or perhaps a century. The Magnificent Starship: The financial implications are mind-boggling even before Musk announced the new Starship. Despite its size and power, the rocket system is less expensive than the Falcon 9, owing to its reusable architecture. Musk has disclosed that Starship flights might cost as little as $2 million each launch, compared to 62 million for each Falcon 9! So, picture the new, larger, and more powerful nuclear Starship! There's no getting around it: Starship 2.0 is massive! Musk said that it is up to eight times bigger than the present model!

In the era of New Space, billionaire Elon Musk is blazing the trail. He’s building a gigantic starship to fly humans further than ever before. In the tiny Texan hamlet of Boca Chica, a huge rocket is being built and tested. It’s Elon Musk’s Starship, a 120-metre-high spacecraft whose mission is to transport humans to the moon and beyond, to Mars. Musk and his company SpaceX are at the forefront of what’s being called ‘New Space’, the rush to commercialise the space sector. His ambition is extraordinary; he wants to colonise the Red Planet. “It’s helpful to have the objective of a self-sustaining city on Mars. This has to be the objective”, says Musk. In his quest to perfect the Starship, Musk has been blowing up prototypes. “He doesn't really care if it's messy, he doesn’t really care if it appears to be chaotic, he's trying to go forward into the future as fast as possible”, says space writer Eric Berger. But the mighty rocket has its critics, including a former head of NASA, Charlie Bolden. “The difficulty for me as a huge fan of SpaceX, but a huge sceptic about Starship is the fact that it's so big, it's so massive”, says Bolden. “If Neil Armstrong were alive today to talk to them, he would probably say, "That is the dumbest thing I've ever heard.” US correspondent Sarah Ferguson heads to Texas to see Musk’s space base up close. She joins a band of devotees in Boca Chica, from Gene the local surfer to MaryLiz and Ryan who are dedicating their lives to documenting the billionaire’s space odyssey. She speaks to members of the ‘space establishment’ – former and current NASA executives who’ve decided to accept and work with the great disruptor. NASA recently awarded Musk a multi-billion-dollar contract to build its next moon lander. “I think actually this will be a perfect example of ‘New Space’ and ‘Old Space’ meeting together in a great new mission”, says Kathy Lueders, head of the NASA mission to send humans back to the moon. Sarah travels to Florida’s space coast to witness the launch of SpaceX’s Inspiration4, the first time civilians have flown into orbit. Musk is a polarising figure, but he’s changed forever how humans view space.

Monday, August 1, 2022

How Long Will an EMP and its Aftermath Last

EMPs: Electromagnetic Pulses. To many preppers, EMPs are seen as the penultimate doomsday event. Be they a naturally occurring phenomenon or the byproduct of man-made superweapons, EMPs are theorized to knock humanity back to an Industrial Age state of being in a literal blink, or perhaps even worse.

By disabling or destroying any electrical device that utilizes a circuit board, an EMP will eliminate virtually every unhardened piece of modern technology. What preppers want to know is how long it will last?

An EMP is both an instant occurrence and an aftermath: EMP itself radiates outward from its source at nearly the speed of light. These waves will interact will electrical devices and inflict damage nearly instantly.

The duration of an EMP aftermath is highly variable depending on severity. Light damage can be repaired in days or weeks. Severe or widespread damage might take years or a decade or more to replace.

Complications

There is more to consider than just the EMP “burst” and its effects, since some weapons that generate EMPs as a secondary effect, like a nuclear warhead for instance, will “sow” electromagnetic interference in the form of nuclear fallout, the “radiation” component of this fallout being, you got it, radio waves.

This manifests as continual disruption of devices that receive or transmit radio waves, and potentially can interfere with solid state electronics like the main pulse.

This effect will be present until the radioactive material has gone though several phases of its half-life or it is cleaned away entirely. Again, replacement or repair of affected electronics will be required.

So while EMPs are typified as a large, wide area event, EMP effects can take several forms and the duration of each is dependent on its nature.

Survivability

The only way to protect functionality is to specially harden the device against EMP by design, an expensive and, frankly, theoretical proposition since most electronics have not been tested against an EMP of the magnitude which is likely to cause a regional or national crisis.

“Isolation” of sensitive electronics is possible with Faraday cages, but again this is beyond the reach of nearly all preppers when it comes to proper testing.

One of the only surefire ways of preventing a total-loss of capability from an EMP is to go “analog”. While not entirely true, as electronics utilizing early vacuum tube technology are practically immune to an EMP.

The electrical potential needed to overwhelm and force a vacuum tube’s receiving plate to feed power in reverse is astounding, and any EMP that is generated close enough to the vacuum tube to accomplish that (one generated by nuclear weapons, at least) would be a moot point since the tube would be destroyed.

The other major factor in determining the duration of an EMP’s practical effects is in the intensity of the pulse itself. An EMP can potentially destroy only the most delicate of electronics, or it can pop fuses and trip circuit breakers. It is capable of being so strong it literally immolates power lines and vaporize conductors. It all depends on its strength.

A comparatively minor EMP may only result in a bunch of burned out consumer electronics heading for landfills. Anything protected by a circuit breaker or fuse and not containing a computer chip should survive and be ready to go when the fuse is replaced or the breaker reset.

Anything subjected to a strong enough EMP that slags conductors and fried electrical systems and circuit boards alike will the stuff doomsday is made of; there is no telling how long it would take to repair such catastrophic damage over so wide an area.

Conclusion

While an EMP is itself over in a millisecond, its effects can persist for weeks or months in the form of radioactive fallout if it was generated by a nuclear detonation.

The damage caused by an EMP will in effect render the world a snapshot to its silent and invisible havoc; depending on the strength of the EMP, anything from minor repair to complete overhaul and replacement of all affected electrical systems may be required, taking years or even a decade or more to fix.

Tom Marlowe grew up with a gun in his hand, and has held all kinds of jobs in the gun industry: range safety, sales, instruction and consulting, He has the experience in helping civilian shooters figure out what firearms work best for them.

I don’t know your background or where you got the information for this article; but, you’ve gotten so many facts wrong I have to take them on and explain them; however, to be honest, not many people have the physics background to understand or really explain an EMP.

I’ll add more here later today as I get iime.

There are no EMP’s that originate from a naturally occurring phenomenon and although a CME (Solar Coronal Mass Ejection) can have similar effects, they are limited to long lines (antennas) like power and communications infrastructure and are unlikely to affect any electronic device not connected to a long wire antenna or the power grid.

The major difference is the frequency (rise time) of the generated pulses.

Actually, most small consumer devices are hardened more than people know.

They have to endure ESD, that spark from your finger when you walk across the room and also interference from the radio waves emitted from many other consumer devices, like fence chargers, neon lights, LED light bulbs and some HDTV’s.

That is true in some instances; but, not all devices in all cases, since it depends on the type of circuit board in the device, the type of case, what kind and how much ESD protection is in the design, and the orientation of the device to the incoming EM wave front.

Severity will again depend on the device, its orientation, and how much conductive material is there to “receive” the energy.

I think that most of my systems, including my generator has a good chance of surviving; but, the biggest effect on long term duration and down time, will be the power grid, since it has thousands of miles of power lines to act as antennas that will collect the energy from a pulse and damage the infrastructure, including high voltage switch gear and transformers, some of which are custom built and too large and expensive to be kept in stock.

Anything you have plugged into the power grid during and EMP is also likely to be damaged.

Complications

The radiation components of fallout are definitively not radio waves; but, a combination of Alpha & Beta Particles and Gamma Rays, with the Gamma being the only EM radiation.

If the Alpha, Beta, and Gamma are of sufficient intensity (ionizing radiation) they can ionize the air around them and ionized air can emit radio frequency noise, like that hears on an AM radio during a thunderstorm.

That radio noise is also what remote lightning detectors use when you see the meteorologists showing lightning activity maps.

This manifests as continual disruption of devices that receive or transmit radio waves, and potentially can interfere with solid state electronics like the main pulse.

No it cannot. See the explanation above.

It can interfere with radio communications; but, has nothing to do with solid state vs. vacuum tube based equipment. I have both and see & hear this clearly during thunderstorms, both local and remote.

This is correct; but, once again, the residual radiation from fallout will not damage undamaged or functional equipment, only cause radio frequency interference

Survivability

This really depends on the device. While most consumer devices are not tested against an EMP specification, they are compliance tested for FCC emissions (a two way function) and for ESD, so small devices unconnected to outside wiring (power lines, cable TV, telephone lines, etc) are likely to be undamaged,

“Isolation” of sensitive electronics is possible with Faraday cages, but again this is beyond the reach of nearly all preppers when it comes to proper testing.

A good faraday enclosure for a single device is easy and rather foolproof. Place the device in a cardboard box, with the original container often being the best fit.

Wrap the box with several overlapping layers of aluminum foil in one direction, Tuck in the foil sticking out around the box, and then wrap the side of the box with cardboard still showing. Ticj this vox on a shelf or in a srawer.

Analog? What does that even mean? I use both solid state and vacuum tube equipment with both analog and digital communications.

If you actually meant using vacuum tubes, they would be mostly immune to the EMP effects; but, be prepared to have lots of power available, since they are often heavier, use much higher voltages and currents to operate, generating a lot of heat in the process. The weight and power are one reason that solid state electronics have overtaken them.

OTOH, tube type equipment is durable. I gave some Equipment I built back in the 1970’s that had not been operated in a decade to a friend who is a new ham. He connected it and it was still operating like new.

Destroyed along with its owner and the building where they were hiding due to heat and blast effects of the weapon.

It is not likely to vaporize conductors; but, circuit breakers and fuses within the power grid may all be subject to tripping &/or failure.

Wow. You don’t seem to understand the rise time of an EMP pulse, that will go right around / through fuses and breakers before they can trip.and can still cause damage, The best option is still to not have equipment connected to outside antennas, like the power grid, cable TV or telephone lines.

Conclusion

While an EMP is itself over in a millisecond, its effects can persist for weeks or months in the form of radioactive fallout if it was generated by a nuclear detonation.

True; but, once again that fallout, while dangerous to living creatures, is unlikely to cause any additional equipment damage, once it is functional.

Unconnected small items may easily survive; but, the power grids (there are 3) as a national energy provider will likely be damaged and take months or more to repair.