Duterte committed treason

A Call to the Filipino People: The Philippine military should remove him and the Allies should give support to deliver him to the Hague or do away with this traitor.

Dear Filipinos, it is absolutely clear that you cannot rely for protection, support and care from the so-called president of your nation who has a defeatist attitude and inferiority complex, even the so-called senate president aka the National Idiot of the nation, because their loyalty is not to you, the Filipino people but to China. He has been paid off by China.

Sad but true!

Hence, as the heirs and grandchildren of your noble warriors and heroes, you have no choice but to rely to your very selves.

You have to unite and stand as one, with the help and solidarity from your military since your congress is weak, all allies, such as  Vietnam, Japan, Taiwan, Australia, the EU and your fellow ASEAN friends. Together as One, United as One — you shall win this fight against the imperialism and bullyism of China.Top government officials such as Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr., Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana, and Presidential Spokesperson Salvador Panelo, initially issued stinging statements over the incident.

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“In the past several days, Duterte has whined without end about the hopelessness of the Philippines as a nation. His treason is the logical conclusion of this frustration. Duterte is no longer invested in the Philippines, but in China."

“The Philippine national interest, as you know it, is now against his own personal interest and fortune. More than a traitor, Duterte is just a glorified carpetbagger, with loyalties to no one but himself.” Three years after The Hague ruling in favor of Manila, Duterte faces impeachment threat over fishing deal with China.

Duterte has been accused of gambling the Philippines' territorial integrity to 'appease' his newfound ally, China [File: Lean Daval Jr/Reuters]

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Mindanao, Philippines - Standing before a few hundred studio audience members and tens of millions more watching from home, then-presidential candidate Rodrigo Duterte swore in an April 2016 televised debate that he was willing to die, if only to assert the Philippines' claim in the South China Sea.

"It has long been my desire to become a hero. So, if they kill me, then I would leave it all to you here in the Philippines to mourn for me," Duterte said in Filipino, as he vowed to sail in the high seas on a jet ski to confront China, and plant the Philippine flag in the disputed islands in the Spratlys and Scarborough.

Halfway through his six-year term in office, the folksy charm that propelled Duterte to the presidency has largely remained intact, with him enjoying an 80 percent satisfaction rating. But the swagger he once directed towards China has long fizzled, replaced with professions of love for its leader, Xi Jinping.

As the Philippines on Friday marks the third year anniversary of The Hague arbitral court ruling, which handed Manila a legal victory against Beijing in the South China Sea, Duterte now finds himself being accused by political opponents and critics of turning his back on his country, and gambling the Philippines' territorial integrity to "appease" his newfound ally, China.

Akbayan, an opposition political party, announced on Tuesday that it would join a group of Filipino fishermen and other groups in filing an impeachment complaint against Duterte for his "deliberate and wrongful breach" of the Constitution.

Former Foreign Affairs chief Albert del Rosario also warned that Duterte "can be impeached" for allowing China to fish in the Philippines' exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The EEZ is considered to be part of the Philippines territory, with its resources "exclusively" reserved for Filipinos, according to its constitution.

Filipinos protest against Duterte's new China deals (02:56)

Their comments came after Duterte disclosed for the first time in late June that he and Xi, the president of China, had a "verbal agreement" allowing Chinese fishermen inside the Philippines' EEZ.

Siding with China

Duterte said the deal formed the basis for his decision not to drive away the Chinese fishermen.

A Chinese vessel was later involved in a boat-ramming incident on June 9, which caused the sinking of a fishing boat with 22 Filipino crew who were left struggling to stay alive in the high seas for hours.

The details of the incident remain contested by Filipino and Chinese officials.

But critics accuse Duterte of siding with China, after he downplayed the near-tragedy at sea as an accident, despite reports pointing to a deliberate attack by suspected Chinese militia.

Media revelations that the Chinese boat abandoned the beleaguered Filipino fishermen, in violation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, further angered the Philippine public.

Supreme Court Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio chastised Duterte, saying the deal he reached with China was unconstitutional.

Carpio said the president should have asserted its legal rights under the international law following the latest incident within the Philippines' EEZ.

'Trial of the century'

It was on July 12, 2016, that the court of arbitration in The Hague said China had "no legal basis ... to claim historic rights" to resources falling within its "nine-dash line", which encompasses almost all of the 3.6 million sq km sea lane. It also emphasised the Philippines' "sovereign rights" over its 200-nautical mile EEZ.

The case was seen in the Philippines as the "trial of the century", and its outcome was welcomed not just in Manila, but also in other Southeast Asian capitals wary of China's rise and which also have their own claims in the South China Sea.

OPINION

The Philippines' Duterte: In pursuit of an imperial presidency

by Richard Javad Heydarian

The court's decision, however, was rejected by China, which had refused to participate in the years-long proceedings. China's official news agency Xinhua hit out at the verdict, describing it as an "ill-founded" ruling that was "naturally null and void".

Abigail Valte, a lawyer who was part of the Philippine delegation at The Hague, told Al Jazeera that the hearing and its result was "a very proud moment" for the country.

"I could see long years of preparation coming to fruition. The entire delegation really prepared to make sure we could present our case well. It was a very proud moment," said Valte, who also served as the spokesman of then-President Benigno Aquino, who filed the case against China.

'So much wasted time'

In a scathing opinion published in a national broadsheet, Valte said that three years after the victory, there is "so much wasted time", because of the Duterte administration's "new-fangled friendship with China".

"It has done nothing to improve the tense situation at sea, where our fishermen continue to be harassed by Chinese maritime militia, same with militarisation of the islands," read the article, which Valte shared with Al Jazeera.

Jay Batongbacal, a lawyer and maritime expert at the University of the Philippines, said that three years on, the "efficacy" of The Hague ruling "has been undermined" because of the actions taken by the Duterte administration.

He said statements made by the president and other officials "condone China's actions that had been declared to be in contravention of its obligations under international law".

Why Philippines is building military base near Taiwan (02:36)

"President Duterte's position, giving blanket permission for Chinese fishing in the Philippines' EEZ, is akin to a waiver of the Philippines' regulatory jurisdiction and of its natural resources to a foreign power," he said.

Still, it would be hard to file an impeachment case against the president, Batongbacal said, adding that the "evidenciary challenges make it difficult to support a charge", as there was no written agreement that can be presented as proof in a trial.

Opposition Senator Franklin Drilon, a frequent Duterte critic, also conceded that proving the president's guilt during an impeachment would be problematic.

"The primary evidence would either be a document signed, or a verbal testimony. There is no document. The verbal testimony is between the President and Xi Jinping. So, tell me, who would be witness to that?" he was quoted by news reports as saying.

"The president will not testify against his own interest in an impeachment proceeding."

Still, the senator called on the Duterte administration to press the Philippines' maritime rights against China, and urged the filing of a case against the Chinese crew involved in the boat-ramming incident, saying non-action could be interpreted as an "acquiescence".

The Philippine public also appears to strongly support the country's legal standing against Beijing. A survey result published on July 10 found that 93 percent of Filipinos found it important for the Duterte administration to regain control of its islands in the South China Sea.

Meanwhile, Jose Antonio Custodio, of the Institute for Policy, Strategy and Development Studies, a Manila-based think-tank, said the Philippines was now considered by its neighbouring countries as an "enabler of China".

"This is can be seen in Manila's refusal to go against Beijing's wishes and in foot dragging in multilateral efforts to address the issue," Custodio said, referring to the proposed South China Sea Code of Conduct deal being negotiated between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

Philippines seeks probe into boat sinking by Chinese vessel (02:41)

"The Duterte administration sees China as its insurance against a backlash from the international community once its sordid human rights record is investigated," he added.

"Beijing will provide the protection to Duterte and his administration to weather the international pressure against the Philippines."

As tensions rise in the South China Sea, Custodio noted, that the Philippines' traditional ally, the United States, is now trying "a more aggressive" strategy, including freedom-of-navigation patrols, assistance to allied countries and economic pressure on China.

"The US has made China feel its presence, and if the Philippines refuses to complain, then it is either a fool for not wanting to defend its own territory, or a tool of China by trying to belittle the value of multilateral efforts.

Duterte has long maintained that he will not risk going to war with China, by aggressively pressing Beijing about Manila's territorial claim.

That is, however, a "false choice" intended "to silence criticism and ensure submission to government decision and policy without question", Batongbacal of the University of the Philippines said.

As the controversy continues to brew, Duterte promised to address the Philippines' claim in the South China Sea in his annual address to the nation on July 22.

The president's spokesman, Salvador Panelo, said the Philippines won't be "hasty" in dealing with the disputed areas "but instead will do everything legal and feasible".

"But the reality again, as repeated by the president, they (China) are in possession of the disputed islands," Panelo said.

Duterte Speaks Treason

LET US CHANGE THE NAME SOUTH CHINA SEA TO THE PROPER NAME OF WEST PHILIPPINE SEA

Since the Philippines faces this body of water and China is more than a thousand miles away what would be more appropriate than to change the name to the West Philippine Sea. South China Sea with a total coastline measuring approximately 130,000 km (81,250 miles) long; whereas the Southern China’s coastline measured about 2,800 km (1,750 miles) in length.

Other proposals have included the “Indochina Sea” and the “Asean Sea,” though that last one bumps into the problem of Cambodia, a member of ASEAN, siding more with China (and earning Beijing’s appreciation along the way).The sea has had a variety of names throughout history, with “South China Sea” being a relatively recent invention (paywall), coming into use in the 1930s as a way to distinguish the waterway from the East China Sea.

China can play the name game, too. In the Chinese language, the sea is called simply Nanhai, or the South Sea. Some have proposed renaming the southern Hainan Province, which faces the sea, to “Nanhai Province.” Proponents contend the name change would help fortify China’s claims to the sea.

In English, changing the name of the sea to “South Sea” might work, argued Ellen Frost, a senior adviser at the East-West Center, earlier this year. Chinese nationalists would surely reject the “Southeast Asia Sea,” she noted (pdf). But they’d have a harder time arguing against the “South Sea”—even though it removes “China”—since in Chinese the name ”Nanhai” has been around for centuries. The northern end of the West Philippine Sea is at Hainan Island which is the Southern most part of China.

This is the patrimony of Southeast Asian nations, the lifeblood of their coastal communities, and the livelihood of millions of their citizens. The United States stands alongside the Philippines and other Southeast Asian partners to uphold a rules-based order that ensures sovereign, sustainable, and productive access to the South China Sea and its resources.

At last month’s ASEAN Summit, ASEAN leaders reaffirmed the importance of maintaining the South China Sea “as a sea of peace, stability, and prosperity.” To strengthen our support for sovereignty and freedom of the seas, this week, the United States announced an important change in US policy regarding maritime claims in the South China Sea.

As US Secretary of State Pompeo explained, the United States rejects any People’s Republic of China (PRC) maritime claims within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone or continental shelf, and claims in waters beyond 12 nautical miles from the islands in the Spratlys. Beijing’s harassment of Philippine fisheries and offshore energy development within those areas is unlawful, as are any unilateral PRC actions to exploit those resources. Under the 2016 Arbitral Tribunal Award, which is final and legally binding, the Philippines enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction with respect to the natural resources in its EEZ. As Secretary of Foreign Affairs Locsin remarked this weekend on the anniversary of the ruling, “The arbitral tribunal’s award of 12 July 2016 represents a victory, not just for the Philippines, but for the entire community of consistently law-abiding nations.”

Why is this important? Here in the Philippines, the West Philippine Sea epitomizes the rich marine diversity of this country. In its waters, scientists have discovered hundreds of species of fish, coral, seagrass, and other marine life existing in interdependent systems that teach us about the planet’s complexity, fragility, and resilience. These habitats not only provide the fish that fill Filipino fishing vessels (and Filipino plates), they also serve as spawning grounds for schools that populate seas throughout Southeast Asia. Philippine scientists believe some of the species unique to these waters may also hold the key to biomedical breakthroughs, while climate researchers can study ecosystem changes to measure human impact on the environment.

Marine conservation begins with securing territorial integrity; when any nation uses coercion, subversion, disinformation, and other underhanded tactics to further its position in the South China Sea, it denies our friends and partners the right to build a sustainable future. ASEAN leaders expressed concern over activities and serious incidents in the South China Sea which have “eroded trust and confidence, increased tensions, and may undermine peace, security and stability in the region.” The United States remains committed to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows, and will continue to defend the right of freedom of navigation in international waters and airways. Earlier this month, the Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group conducted dual-carrier operations with the Ronald Reagan and Theodore Roosevelt aircraft carriers, demonstrating US commitment to mutual defense agreements and promoting peace and prosperity throughout the Indo-Pacific. 

Don't Allow China to grow militarily, Destroy their armed forces now and hopefully the CCP. 

This is the time to do this planned control of a potential Nazi Germany in the making. and just as what Gen. Douglas MacArthur planned to do during the Korean war. If we do not control it it will be worse in the coming years.

ry?

Defense spending is one of the most direct ways of measuring a country’s potential military capability. Comparing defense spending between countries — whether nominally or as a percent of government expenditure — is a useful gauge of relative military strength. Spending patterns can also reveal key political events that have prompted an increase or decrease in defense allocations. No matter how much a country spends on its military, it still must translate its potential capability for power into desired outcomes.

Understanding the connection between Chinese military spending and Chinese military power is complicated by a lack of transparency. Although Beijing provides figures for its defense spending each year, outside estimates of China’s defense budget are often significantly higher than the official numbers. China provides limited information on the distribution of its military spending, which further obscures spending patterns.

Defense Spending Giants

This interactive compares China’s defense spending from 2000 to 2019 with other key countries. Use the filtering options to select other measures of spending or to look at another country grouping. Data provided by the 

Tracking Chinese Military Spending

There is no universally accepted standard for reporting military spending. While international mechanisms exist, such as the UN Report on Military Expenditures, participation is voluntary. This allows governments to report their expenditure with varying degrees of detail. China joined the UN instrument in 2007, but it remains less transparent than many countries.

The Chinese government reports expenditure information annually. In May 2020, China announced a yearly defense budget of RMB 1.268 trillion ($178.6 billion),1 marking a 6.6 percent2 increase from the 2019 budget of 1.19 trillion yuan ($177.5 billion).3 This follows a recent trend that has seen yearly percent increases in spending fall to single digits.

Yet, how much China actually spends on its military is widely debated. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates the overall 2018 figure at nearly $254 billion and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) puts the number at $225 billion. The US Department of Defense (DoD) concludes that China’s 2018 defense budget likely exceeded $200 billion.  

Notwithstanding these differences, Beijing’s official figures may now more accurately represent defense expenditures than in the past. In 2002, the DoD reported that China’s actual defense spending may have been upwards of four times larger than its officially announced budget. In comparison, the 2019 estimate from SIPRI pegs China’s nominal defense spending at $261 billion – 1.5 times larger than the official figure.

Varying levels of transparency from Beijing compound outside efforts to estimate China’s defense budget. The publication of 11 defense white papers since 1995 has provided some insight into the nature of Chinese military spending, but with varying degrees of specificity. White papers published between 1998 and 2008 included comparative budget breakdowns between China and countries like Japan and Russia. These comparisons were removed from white papers after 2008, but reappeared in the most recent white paper that was released in July 2019.
Chinese Defense Expenditure Breakdown
Billions of Dollars (2017)
Total
Amount Percentage (%)
Personnel 47.51 30.8
Training & Maintenance 43.41 28.1
Equipment 63.47 41.1
Total 154.39 100Source:United Nations






Most defense white papers – except those released in 2013 and 2015 – also outline three spending categories: personnel, training and maintenance, and equipment.4 Beijing states that it annually reports categorized military spending information to the UN; however, this information is only available from the UN in one-page reports for fiscal years 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2017. 5 The reports from the mid-2000s show roughly equal spending between each of these three categories. The 2019 white paper, which includes spending breakdowns between 2010 and 2017, reveals a noticeable shift away from this even distribution. Spending on equipment now accounts for the largest share of the defense budget, accounting for just over 41 percent of total spending in 2017.

Please note that the figures in the graph above are based on spending figures provided in the 2019 defense white paper and do not match with figures provided by the Ministry of Finance.

Official military spending is further complicated by the Chinese government’s inconsistent reporting of figures. Figures provided by the Ministry of Finance differ from the expenditures reported in the 2019 defense white paper.6 This discrepancy may be the result of the Ministry of Finance not including the costs associated with militia forces in its defense figures. In 2017, this inconsistency resulted in a difference of $2.9 billion.

China’s lack of transparency leads to discrepancies between official figures and outside estimates due to differences in what expenditures are included in the budget. Official figures do not account for a number of military-related outlays, including aspects of China’s space program, extra-budgetary revenues from military-owned commercial enterprises, defense mobilization funds, authorized sales of land or excess food produced by some units, recruitment bonuses for college students, and provincial military base operating costs.
Comparison of Official Military Spending Figures

Billions of RMB (Billions of USD)
Year	Ministry of Finance	2019 Defense White Paper
2017	¥1023.7 ($151.5)	¥1043.2 ($154.4)
2016	¥954.6 ($143.7)	¥976.6 ($147.0)
2015	¥886.9 ($142.4)	¥908.8 ($145.9)
2014	¥805.5 ($131.1)	¥829.0 ($134.9)
2013	¥720.2 ($116.3)	¥741.1 ($119.6)
2012	¥650.6 ($103.1)	¥669.2 ($106.0)
2011	¥583.0 ($90.2)	¥602.8 ($93.3)
2010	¥518.2 ($76.5)	¥533.3 ($78.8)
Source: Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Defense.
USD values are based on average annual RMB-USD conversions using data provided by the IMF.

Official military spending also excludes spending on public security, which includes the People’s Armed Police (PAP). The PAP is a paramilitary police component of China’s armed forces that is charged with internal security, law enforcement, and maritime rights protection. The Central Military Commission maintains direct control of the PAP. The official budget for the PAP was RMB 179.78 billion ($26.8 billion) in 2019.

China is not alone in excluding elements of defense-related spending from its official defense budget. India’s paramilitary forces, which make up the Central Armed Police Forces, fall under the Ministry of Home Affairs, not the Ministry of Defense. India is also not forthcoming about space and nuclear weapons expenditures. The United States funds its nuclear weapons through the Department of Energy and does not include these details in its defense budget. However, the US government maintains a high level of budgetary transparency, which enables analysts to readily account for discrepancies.

Estimates of China’s military budget are further complicated by the reporting of costs not typically included in many Western defense budgets. Historically, expenses incurred by military infrastructure construction were assumed to be included in the official figures, although many of these projects are designed to be dual-use and use funding from local and national non-defense budgets. Disaster relief is likewise funded through the defense budget and is to be reimbursed by non-defense agencies, but the mechanisms and effectiveness of this reimbursement remain unclear.
A Conversation With Richard Bitzinger

Prerequisites for retired senior officers — including offices, assistants, and special access to hospital facilities — are all funded through China’s defense budget. Many of these functions and associated costs are typically incurred in Western countries by nonmilitary organizations, a discrepancy that further complicates estimates of China’s military budget. It remains unclear what percentage these expenditures constitute of China’s total defense budget.




The inconsistencies in estimates are further complicated by a lack of pricing information. Beijing does not release accurate cost data for military goods and services, making it difficult to make calculations based on purchasing power parity (PPP). Some of the chief challenges are uncertainty over which goods to place in China’s defense spending basket, and which goods to compare between China and other countries. Independent organizations, such as IISS, caveat their PPP estimates, noting that no specific PPP rate applies to the Chinese military sector and that there is no definitive means through which elements of military spending can be calculated using PPP rates.
Comparing Chinese Military Spending


Calculations in this section are derived from the SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.8


China’s defense spending has seen a nearly seven-fold increase over the past two decades, jumping from $39.6 billion in 1999 to $266.4 billion in 2019. China currently spends more on defense than Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Vietnam combined, and China’s military spending is second only to the United States.


This growth in military spending is tied to China’s rising gross domestic product (GDP). Since 2000, China’s defense expenditures as a share of its GDP has hovered at around 2 percent. In comparison, Japan’s military spending remains set at approximately 1 percent of its GDP, but this could change in the future as Prime Minister Abe has pushed for a spending increase. 

China’s rising defense spending follows from over two decades of modernization efforts. China began military modernization in earnest after the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, which exposed fundamental weaknesses in China’s ability to deter foreign intervention in sovereignty disputes. The increase in China’s defense spending during this period was, in part, also a response to domestic policies that left China’s defense budget relatively stagnant prior to the 2000s.

Aggregate spending increases have corresponded with several high-profile procurement programs, military reforms, and doctrinal and strategic shifts within the People’s Liberation Army. These shifts have facilitated China playing a larger role in regional and international security. Some of these efforts, such as China’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations, antipiracy efforts, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief are welcome contributions to global governance. On the other hand, defending China’s growing security interests in the East and South China Seas has strained relations with other regional actors.



China’s naval expansion allows it to play a greater role in international security issues. As of 2018, the Chinese Navy consists of over 300 ships, making it larger than the US Navy’s 287 deployable vessels. Learn more.


EXPLORE MORE 

Despite considerable increases over the past fifteen years, China’s military budget pales in comparison to that of the US. The US spent 3.4 percent of its GDP on defense in 2019, and its nominal expenditure was more than two and a half times higher than that of China. Even when accounting for reporting discrepancies, China would have to raise its spending considerably to match the US defense budget. However, it is worth noting that the United States maintains a global military presence while China remains primarily focused on security issues within the Indo-Pacific. 

When considering military spending as a percent of total government expenditure, Chinese military spending has dropped noticeably — from 12.0 percent in 2001 to 5.4 percent in 2019. After a marked increase from 2002 to 2011, US spending has likewise decreased and returned to pre-September 11 levels (9.6 percent in 2001 and 9.4 percent in 2019). Although Russia’s spending remains high, it declined from 14.8 percent in 2016 to 11.4 percent in 2019. For the most part, spending elsewhere in the region either dipped in 2019 or remained steady.

 

Looking at broader regional trends, East Asia spends close to the same amount as Western and Eastern Europe combined. East Asian spending has increased from $92.8 billion in 1990 to $363 billion in 2019. Much of this growth in expenditure has been driven by China. In 1990, China constituted 23.6 percent of total East Asian expenditure. As of 2019, this number stands at 70.5 percent. In terms of the broader regional context, the Chinese military budget constitutes 52.2 percent of the total cumulative spending across all of Asia (including those in the Middle East)

What Do Chinese and Russians Think of the U.S. Military?

A recent article touches on U.S. perceptions of its military. But how do other countries view it?

In the article “The Tragedy of the American Military,” author James Fallows posits that the U.S. military escapes external scrutiny due to a growing gap between those who have and those who have not served. The result of this gulf is that “outsiders treat it both too reverently and too cavalierly, as if regarding its members as heroes makes up for committing them to unending, unwinnable missions…” Fallows postulates that this results in the creation of a “Chickenhawk Nation, based on the derisive term for those eager to go to war, as long as someone else is going. It would be the story of a country willing to do anything for its military except take it seriously.”

Fallows appears to have re-ignited a new discussion on civil-military relations in the United States as illustrated by the many thoughtful responses by readers of the article. However, after reading the article and going over some of the comments, what appears to be missing so far in the discussion is the view of the genuine outsiders: How do people in countries such as China and Russia view the U.S. military?

The default answer to that question is simple: They view it as a threat.

According to a Spring 2014 Attitudes Survey by the PEW Research Center, China sees the United States as its biggest threat. Another survey conducted in Russia showed that Russians are more afraid of the United States than the Islamic State. This should not come as a surprise. The one thing any foreigner cannot do is to refuse to take the U.S. military “seriously” – after all it is the most deadly force in the world and, given the history of U.S. civil-military relations, more likely to be used outside the United States than inside the country. So if, as Fallows postulates, there is a growing gap between the civilian and military worlds in the United States, and – most importantly – if the cost of war is only shared by a tiny percentage of the population, foreigners may be excused for assuming that this will perhaps lead to increased U.S. bellicosity.

While there is of course a difference in perceptions between U.S. allies and U.S. adversaries, I posit that the sensation of this latent fear holds true, in varying degrees, for a diverse range of countries (in 2013 another survey found that the United States was seen as the greatest threat to peace in the world). The United States is the indispensable military power, but this seldom translates into genuine gratitude and more often than not slides into open anti-Americanism, as history has illustrated time and again. Based on my own discussions with policymakers in Europe and Asia, the attitude of most U.S. allies is that the only thing worse than fighting with the United States is to fight without her.

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No matter how much American pundits and scholars of U.S. civil-military relations point to the marginalization of the military within the United States, to outsiders, the perception is often that of a “New Prussia” – partially brought about by the everyday veneration of U.S. service personal, but more importantly by the sheer preponderance of U.S. military power. As I have pointed out elsewhere, a report by the Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy illustrates how superior resources may cause a skewed perception:

DoD’s regional combatant commanders have come to be perceived by states and other actors as the most influential U.S. government regional representative. It is argued that the resources that combatant commanders control, their presence and frequent travel throughout the region, and even the symbolic impact of their aircraft and accompanying service members, all combine to place them in perceived position of preeminence.

This assertion is supported by a study of The Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), the most comprehensive effort to date to analyze the U.S. national security system and propose recommendations to alleviate many of its bureaucratic problems (disclaimer: I worked as a research analyst for PNSR). Its report conclusion emphasizes that an inequality of resources leads to an inequality in policy; i.e., the militarization of U.S. foreign policy.A

True or not, this perception is also widespread outside the United States. Consequently, the alleged militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy paired with Fallows’ assertion of the United States as a “chickenhawk nation” should cause some consternation among security analysts – not only in Beijing and Moscow, but perhaps also in Western European capitals.

China Threatens to Throw America 'Into the Mighty Sea of the Coronavirus.'

China is threatening to wreak havoc on America’s drug supply amid the Wuhan coronavirus outbreak. Thanks to our globalist elite and especially missteps during the Obama-Biden administration, Beijing has the power to do just that.

China is threatening to wreak havoc on America’s drug supply amid the Wuhan coronavirus outbreak. Thanks to our globalist elite and especially missteps during the Obama-Biden administration, Beijing has the power to do just that.

In an article in Xinhua, one of the Chinese Communist Party’s mouthpieces, Beijing threatened that it can impose pharmaceutical export controls after which America will be “plunged into the mighty sea of coronavirus.”

Unfortunately, Beijing isn’t bluffing about this capability.

As Rosemary Gibson, co-author of “China Rx: Exposing the Risks of America’s Dependence on China for Medicine,” testified to a congressional commission last summer, China has a dominant role in the manufacture of the generic drugs that comprise 90 percent of what Americans take.

Even finished drugs from other sources are dependent on China. Another major source of generic drugs is India, and 80 percent of that country’s drug ingredients come from China.

There are many culprits behind this betrayal, but some deserve special mention. 

Foremost is the globalist cabal that exported our industries to China in the name of “free trade.” As Gibson also reports, within four years of passage of the Clinton-era law giving China unfettered access to U.S. markets and WTO membership, “the last penicillin fermentation plant in the U.S. closed; China’s vitamin C cartel forced the closure of the last U.S. production facility, and the last aspirin manufacturing facility ceased business because of predatory pricing by Chinese firms.”

The Chinese government has used its favorite playbook to make the world dependent on its drugs: protecting and subsidizing domestic manufacturers to undersell American competitors, aided by Chinese industrial espionage. Indeed, biotechnology is one of ten categories of Beijing’s “Made in China 2025” industrial strategy which has driven so much of its theft of intellectual property and dumping of goods at below-market prices to kill U.S. businesses.

Among the globalists, the former Obama-Biden administration is particularly culpable for putting America at risk. During the eight years of that administration, then-Vice President Biden was often the frontman for responding to the increasing number of foreign outbreaks to which America has been exposed.

During the H1N1 (swine flu) pandemic in 2009, Biden incorrectly addressed the public about the outbreak, “I would tell members of my family, and I have, I wouldn’t go anywhere in confined places right now… It’s that you are in a confined aircraft. When one person sneezes, it goes everywhere through the aircraft.”

Speaking about the 2014-2016 Ebola outbreak, Biden recently said, “I was part of making sure that pandemic did not get to the United States, saved millions of lives.” In fact, the Obama administration admitted people known to have the disease to America.

During the Zika virus outbreak, Biden was in charge of pressuring Congress for funds. 

Are we to believe that amid all of this attention to outbreak that Biden and his globalist colleagues didn’t know of America’s growing inability to make even the most basic pharmaceuticals? Throughout the Obama-Biden administration, our dependence on China got much worse. 

Last month, Biden criticized the Trump administration’s response to Wuhan coronavirus. Initially, he slammed the president’s unprecedented decision to stop flights from China: “This is no time for Donald Trump’s record of hysteria and xenophobia--hysterical xenophobia--and fearmongering.”

Later he flip-flopped to accusing Trump of not doing enough, imagining if he were president that, “I would be on the phone with China making it clear we are going to need to be in your country. You have to be open. You have to be clear. We have to know what’s going on.”

Of course, Beijing’s unwillingness to allow anything of the sort is a reason their coronavirus has spread far and wide. Oddly, Biden and his fellow globalists remain sanguine about China and their ability to influence its communist government. Last year, he said of China, “they’re not bad folks,” and “they’re not competition for us.” 

Of course Biden was not alone, and neither were the Democrats. The House of Bush was always fond of the myth that economic engagement of China, evidently on terms favorable to Beijing, would turn an adversary into an ally. The myth lives on. Bob Zoellick, who was George W. Bush’s trade kingpin, has been an outspoken opponent of Trump’s effort to end U.S. dependence on China, lamely claiming, “You can’t contain China.”

To fix this medical vulnerability, Trump should apply gradually increasing, permanent tariffs on Chinese drugs and ingredients. He should also establish a strategic reserve of drugs by requiring the Defense Department and Veterans Affairs to buy only drugs that are 100 percent made in America. This domestic demand would create domestic supply.

Trump should also press drug companies to start a crash program to achieve supply chain independence from China. If would be great if he could achieve this through an appeal to patriotism. If not, he should use the Defense Production Act of 1950 to force the issue.

It’s time to reverse the globalist sellout of America that has put Beijing in charge of our drug supply chain.

"China Is A Threat To The World, Building Military Rapidly": Donald Trump

China has hiked its military spending by seven per cent to USD 152 billion as Beijing aims at countering America's push into the disputed South China Sea.

"China is a threat to the world...they are building a military faster than anybody," Trump said 

Expressing concern over China's growing military might, US President Donald Trump has said the Communist nation is a threat to the world and blamed his predecessors for not stopping it from stealing America's intellectual property to bolster its defence capabilities.

China has hiked its military spending by seven per cent to USD 152 billion as Beijing aims at countering America's push into the disputed South China Sea.

"Obviously China is a threat to the world in a sense because they are building a military faster than anybody and frankly they are using US money," Donald Trump, who was accompanied by visiting Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, told reporters in Washington on Friday.

Donald Trump said the US Presidents before him allowed China to take out USD 500 billion a year and more than that. "They have allowed China to steal our intellectual property and property rights and I'm not doing that," he said.

However, President Trump said the two countries were very close to having a trade deal.

"We work very closely, had intellectual property, all of the tough things work negotiated and then at the last moment, they said we cannot agree to this," he alleged, referring to the abrupt collapse of the trade deal with China early this year.

"I said that's all right we are charging you 25 per cent tariffs and then it's going up and it will continue to go up. Frankly we are making so many hundreds of the numbers that we are taking in to our treasury...Look at the great reports that came out two days ago on retailing, on consumers, on numbers that nobody believes," he added.

The world's two largest economies are locked in a trade war since Donald Trump in March last year imposed tariff hikes of up to 25 per cent on USD 250 billion of Chinese goods. In response, China, the world's second largest economy after the US, imposed tit-for-tat tariffs on USD 110 billion of American goods.

The two countries have resumed their trade negotiations.

Donald Trump has said that he will enter into a trade deal with Beijing only if he is confident that it is good for the US.

"We are taking hundreds of millions potentially over a short period of time, hundreds of billions of dollars worth of money is coming in from China that never came in before so China wants to make a deal, I think we want to make a deal," Donald Trump said.

"We will see what happens, but I view China in many different ways, but right now I am thinking about trade. But you know trade equals military because if we allow China to take USD 500 billion out of the hide of the United States that money goes into military and other things," said the US president.

Donald Trump went on to say that "They're having a bad year. Worst year in 57 years. Their tariffs aren't coming into us. We're taking in billions and billions of dollars of tariffs. They are devaluing their currency, which means the tariffs are not costing us probably anything, but certainly not very much. They're also adding a lot of money into their economy. They're pouring money into their economy, but were taking in many billions of dollars," he said.

"At some point in the not-too-distant future, it'll be over USD 100 billion. We've never taken in 100 cents from China. It was always the other way around. With that, they lost over 3 million jobs there. Supply chain is crashing, and they have a lot of problems. And want to make a deal. So, we'll see what happens," Donald Trump said.